Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'De formis' and '(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
12596 Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman]
12599 Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
12595 We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
12597 I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
12598 Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
16719 The primary qualities are mixed to cause secondary qualities [Burley]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
12602 There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman]
12603 We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
12601 The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
12592 Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
12590 Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman]
12593 The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
12588 Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman]
12589 Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman]
12600 The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
12594 If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
12591 Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman]