Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Reference and Modality' and '21: First Epistle of Peter'

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19 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
10928 Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10925 Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10926 Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
10930 Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine]
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14645 To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9201 Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
10927 Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
9203 We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
10931 We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
17593 Always be ready to give reasons for your beliefs [Peter]