Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Structure and Nature' and 'Inexpressible Properties and Propositions'

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15 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
17990 Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
17988 Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
10242 I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
10243 My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
17989 Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
17991 Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber]