Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Structure and Nature' and 'Philosophy of Language'

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19 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
7755 Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
10242 I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
10243 My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
7768 The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
7766 Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
7764 Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan]
7763 It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7770 Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
7773 A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan]
7774 Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan]