Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Reportatio' and 'Appearance and Reality'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Metaphysics is finding bad reasons for instinctive beliefs [Bradley]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Internal relations are said to be intrinsic properties of two terms, and of the whole they compose [Bradley, by Russell]
Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
British Idealists said reality is a single Mind which experiences itself [Bradley, by Grayling]
Bradley's objective idealism accepts reality (the Absolute), but says we can't fully describe it [Bradley, by Potter]
Qualities and relations are mere appearance; the Absolute is a single undifferentiated substance [Bradley, by Heil]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good [William of Ockham]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
We could never form a concept of God's wisdom if we couldn't abstract it from creatures [William of Ockham]