58 ideas
| 16295 | Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 15342 | Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 19069 | 'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski] |
| 16296 | Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 10672 | Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack] |
| 15339 | Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 16302 | Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 19135 | Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
| 19138 | Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski] |
| 4699 | Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady] |
| 19324 | Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski] |
| 15410 | Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski] |
| 18811 | Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
| 15365 | We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 19314 | For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
| 19316 | Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
| 19175 | Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson] |
| 16303 | Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 19134 | Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
| 16304 | Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski] |
| 2571 | Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack] |
| 10821 | Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H] |
| 10822 | A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski] |
| 10969 | Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read] |
| 17746 | Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki] |
| 10904 | Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski] |
| 15322 | Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 16306 | Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 18759 | Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee] |
| 10823 | A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski] |
| 18756 | Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee] |
| 19313 | Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
| 16323 | The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 8940 | Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher] |
| 10154 | Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman on Tarski] |
| 4913 | Brain lesions can erase whole categories of perception, suggesting they are hard-wired [Carter,R] |
| 4910 | Sense organs don't discriminate; they reduce various inputs to the same electrical pulses [Carter,R] |
| 4911 | The recognition sequence is: classify, name, locate, associate, feel [Carter,R, by PG] |
| 4919 | There seems to be no dividing line between a memory and a thought [Carter,R] |
| 4908 | No one knows if animals are conscious [Carter,R] |
| 4902 | Pain doesn't have one brain location, but is linked to attention and emotion [Carter,R] |
| 4904 | Proper brains appear at seven weeks, and neonates have as many neurons as adults do [Carter,R] |
| 4915 | In primates, brain size correlates closely with size of social group [Carter,R] |
| 4917 | Consciousness involves awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection [Carter,R] |
| 4916 | There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R] |
| 4905 | Normal babies seem to have overlapping sense experiences [Carter,R] |
| 4918 | In blindsight V1 (normal vision) is inactive, but V5 (movement) lights up [Carter,R] |
| 4912 | Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception [Carter,R] |
| 4903 | Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R] |
| 4920 | Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R] |
| 4906 | Babies show highly emotional brain events, but may well be unaware of them [Carter,R] |
| 4909 | The only way we can control our emotions is by manipulating the outside world that influences them [Carter,R] |
| 4914 | A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies [Carter,R] |
| 20327 | Modern attention has moved from the intrinsic properties of art to its relational properties [Lamarque/Olson] |
| 20407 | Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Tarski, by Schellekens] |
| 20326 | Early 20th cent attempts at defining art focused on significant form, intuition, expression, unity [Lamarque/Olson] |
| 20330 | The dualistic view says works of art are either abstract objects (types), or physical objects [Lamarque/Olson] |
| 4907 | The 'locus coeruleus' is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure centre' [Carter,R] |