10 ideas
12154 | Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry] |
12714 | The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz] |
8969 | We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne] |
12743 | A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz] |
16075 | Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach] |
12152 | Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach] |
16073 | Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman] |
20327 | Modern attention has moved from the intrinsic properties of art to its relational properties [Lamarque/Olson] |
20326 | Early 20th cent attempts at defining art focused on significant form, intuition, expression, unity [Lamarque/Olson] |
20330 | The dualistic view says works of art are either abstract objects (types), or physical objects [Lamarque/Olson] |