Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two-Dimensional Semantics', 'Commentary on Sentences' and 'Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
13407 All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
13409 Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16643 Accidents always remain suited to a subject [Bonaventura]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
16696 Successive things reduce to permanent things [Bonaventura]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14703 Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
14714 Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
14704 2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
13406 A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
13408 Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
14706 Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
14711 Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
14717 Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
13410 Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
14720 Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
14695 Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
14696 Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter]
14697 'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
14698 Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter]
14699 Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter]
14709 Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter]
14719 In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
14701 Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter]
14702 If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter]
14705 Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter]
14715 2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter]
14716 2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter]