88 ideas
14888 | Wisdom prevents us from being ruled by the moment [Nietzsche] |
14863 | Unlike science, true wisdom involves good taste [Nietzsche] |
14890 | Suffering is the meaning of existence [Nietzsche] |
14861 | Philosophy ennobles the world, by producing an artistic conception of our knowledge [Nietzsche] |
14887 | You should only develop a philosophy if you are willing to live by it [Nietzsche] |
14885 | The first aim of a philosopher is a life, not some works [Nietzsche] |
14889 | Philosophy is pointless if it does not advocate, and live, a new way of life [Nietzsche] |
14862 | Philosophy is more valuable than much of science, because of its beauty [Nietzsche] |
14878 | It would better if there was no thought [Nietzsche] |
14881 | Why do people want philosophers? [Nietzsche] |
14876 | Philosophy is always secondary, because it cannot support a popular culture [Nietzsche] |
14860 | Kant has undermined our belief in metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
14859 | If philosophy controls science, then it has to determine its scope, and its value [Nietzsche] |
14880 | Logic is just slavery to language [Nietzsche] |
14869 | If some sort of experience is at the root of matter, then human knowledge is close to its essence [Nietzsche] |
14703 | Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter] |
14714 | Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter] |
14875 | Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche] |
14866 | It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche] |
14704 | 2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter] |
7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
14872 | Our knowledge is illogical, because it rests on false identities between things [Nietzsche] |
14879 | The most extreme scepticism is when you even give up logic [Nietzsche] |
14873 | If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche] |
7852 | The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau] |
7864 | Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau] |
7873 | Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau] |
7874 | Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau] |
7882 | Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau] |
7854 | Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau] |
7889 | Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau] |
7891 | We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau] |
7890 | Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau] |
7885 | The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau] |
7886 | Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau] |
7887 | States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau] |
7888 | Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau] |
14868 | Our primary faculty is perception of structure, as when looking in a mirror [Nietzsche] |
14870 | We experience causation between willing and acting, and thereby explain conjunctions of changes [Nietzsche] |
7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
14867 | It is just madness to think that the mind is supernatural (or even divine!) [Nietzsche] |
7870 | Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau] |
7858 | If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau] |
7865 | Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau] |
7892 | The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau] |
7879 | Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau] |
20971 | Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau] |
7856 | It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau] |
7881 | Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau] |
7866 | Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau] |
7850 | Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it [Papineau] |
7851 | Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states [Papineau] |
14706 | Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter] |
7884 | Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau] |
7863 | If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau] |
14711 | Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter] |
14717 | Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter] |
7883 | Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau] |
7872 | Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau] |
14720 | Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter] |
14695 | Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter] |
14697 | 'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter] |
14696 | Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter] |
7869 | Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau] |
7868 | Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau] |
14698 | Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter] |
14699 | Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter] |
14709 | Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter] |
14719 | In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter] |
14701 | Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter] |
14702 | If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter] |
14705 | Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter] |
14715 | 2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter] |
14716 | 2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter] |
14884 | The shortest path to happiness is forgetfulness, the path of animals (but of little value) [Nietzsche] |
14886 | Education is contrary to human nature [Nietzsche] |
14883 | We should evaluate the past morally [Nietzsche] |
14882 | Protest against vivisection - living things should not become objects of scientific investigation [Nietzsche] |
14865 | We do not know the nature of one single causality [Nietzsche] |
7853 | Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau] |
7857 | Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau] |
14871 | Laws of nature are merely complex networks of relations [Nietzsche] |
20976 | The completeness of physics cannot be proved [Papineau] |
20974 | Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces [Papineau] |
20970 | Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role [Papineau] |
20975 | Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy [Papineau] |
14864 | The Greeks lack a normative theology: each person has their own poetic view of things [Nietzsche] |