Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two-Dimensional Semantics', 'Maxims' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


43 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
To try to be wise all on one's own is folly [Rochefoucauld]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid]
We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
La Rochefoucauld's idea of disguised self-love implies an unconscious mind [Rochefoucauld, by Sartre]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter]
Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter]
Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter]
Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter]
In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter]
If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter]
Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter]
2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter]
2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Judging by effects, love looks more like hatred than friendship [Rochefoucauld]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
Supreme cleverness is knowledge of the real value of things [Rochefoucauld]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Realising our future misery is a kind of happiness [Rochefoucauld]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtue doesn't go far without the support of vanity [Rochefoucauld]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
True friendship is even rarer than true love [Rochefoucauld]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
We are bored by people to whom we ourselves are boring [Rochefoucauld]