Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two-Dimensional Semantics', 'Explanatory Coherence' and 'Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory'

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28 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
10197 An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
10198 If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
10199 Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14703 Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
14714 Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
14704 2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
17065 2: An explanation must wholly cohere internally, and with the new fact [Thagard, by Smart]
17066 3: If an analogous pair explain another analogous pair, then they all cohere [Thagard, by Smart]
17064 1: Coherence is a symmetrical relation between two propositions [Thagard, by Smart]
17067 4: For coherence, observation reports have a degree of intrinsic acceptability [Thagard, by Smart]
17068 5: Contradictory propositions incohere [Thagard, by Smart]
17069 6: A proposition's acceptability depends on its coherence with a system [Thagard, by Smart]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
14706 Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
14711 Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
14717 Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
14720 Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
14695 Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
14697 'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter]
14696 Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
14698 Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter]
14699 Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter]
14709 Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter]
14719 In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
14701 Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter]
14702 If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter]
14705 Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter]
14715 2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter]
14716 2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter]