Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge', 'Introduction to the Theory of Logic' and 'Towards a Universal Characteristic'

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28 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Sets can be defined by 'enumeration', or by 'abstraction' (based on a property) [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
The 'Cartesian Product' of two sets relates them by pairing every element with every element [Zalabardo]
A 'partial ordering' is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Determinacy: an object is either in a set, or it isn't [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / l. Axiom of Specification
Specification: Determinate totals of objects always make a set [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
'Blind thought' is reasoning without recognition of the ingredients of the reasoning [Leibniz, by Arthur,R]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
A first-order 'sentence' is a formula with no free variables [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Γ |= φ for sentences if φ is true when all of Γ is true [Zalabardo]
Γ |= φ if φ is true when all of Γ is true, for all structures and interpretations [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / b. Basic connectives
Propositional logic just needs ¬, and one of ∧, ∨ and → [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo]
We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logically true sentences are true in all structures [Zalabardo]
'Logically true' (|= φ) is true for every truth-assignment [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
Some formulas are 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and interpretation that makes them true [Zalabardo]
A sentence-set is 'satisfiable' if at least one truth-assignment makes them all true [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A structure models a sentence if it is true in the model, and a set of sentences if they are all true in the model [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
We can assign a characteristic number to every single object [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / e. The Lottery paradox
The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
Everything is subsumed under number, which is a metaphysical statics of the universe, revealing powers [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
If a set is defined by induction, then proof by induction can be applied to it [Zalabardo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour]