38 ideas
| 8893 | For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour] |
| 22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn] |
| 8888 | The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour] |
| 8887 | It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour] |
| 22413 | Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn] |
| 22415 | Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn] |
| 22416 | Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn] |
| 22422 | Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn] |
| 22428 | You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn] |
| 22414 | You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn] |
| 22423 | Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn] |
| 22426 | We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn] |
| 22412 | Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn] |
| 22421 | Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn] |
| 22424 | Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn] |
| 22425 | The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn] |
| 7629 | We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn] |
| 8897 | The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour] |
| 8896 | Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour] |
| 8891 | My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour] |
| 8892 | Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour] |
| 8894 | Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour] |
| 8889 | Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour] |
| 8890 | If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour] |
| 8895 | If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour] |
| 22420 | The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn] |
| 18410 | Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn] |
| 22417 | Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn] |
| 18402 | Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn] |
| 22418 | I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn] |
| 4061 | The right to life is not a right not to be killed, but not to be killed unjustly [Thomson] |
| 4057 | A newly fertilized ovum is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree [Thomson] |
| 4695 | Maybe abortion can be justified despite the foetus having full human rights [Thomson, by Foot] |
| 4059 | It can't be murder for a mother to perform an abortion on herself to save her own life [Thomson] |
| 4696 | The foetus is safe in the womb, so abortion initiates its death, with the mother as the agent. [Foot on Thomson] |
| 4058 | Is someone's right to life diminished if they were conceived by a rape? [Thomson] |
| 4060 | The right to life does not bestow the right to use someone else's body to support that life [Thomson] |
| 4062 | No one is morally required to make huge sacrifices to keep someone else alive for nine months [Thomson] |