Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Version of Internalist Foundationalism', 'On Certainty' and 'Implications'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
Deconstructing philosophy gives the history of concepts, and the repressions behind them [Derrida]
The movement of 'différance' is the root of all the oppositional concepts in our language [Derrida]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour]
Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour]
Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein]