Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events', 'The Nature of Mathematics' and 'Epistemic Norms'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
14782 Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
14787 Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
8820 Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
8819 We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
14783 Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
14788 Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
9413 An event is a change in or to an object [Lombard, by Mumford]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
8822 Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
14786 Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
8818 Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
14789 Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
14785 The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
8811 What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
8817 Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8814 Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8823 Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8813 If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
8812 Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock]
8816 Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
8815 Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
14784 Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce]