Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events', 'Logical Necessity: Some Issues' and 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics'

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29 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
9413 An event is a change in or to an object [Lombard, by Mumford]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
6472 Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
6473 Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
6465 We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
6471 The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12184 Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
15083 The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
15084 In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
12180 Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
12181 Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
12183 It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
12192 The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
12182 We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12187 Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
12186 Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
6466 Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
6483 Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H]
8244 Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
6462 Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell]
6463 Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell]
6464 Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell]
6467 No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / c. Unperceived sense-data
6459 We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell]
6460 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell]
6461 Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
6458 Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
6469 Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
6470 Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
6468 There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell]