16 ideas
9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
10882 | Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten] |
10884 | A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten] |
10885 | Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten] |
10881 | The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten] |
9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
23111 | If we say that freedom depends on rationality, the irrational actions are not free [Sidgwick] |
23059 | Self-interest is not rational, if the self is just a succession of memories and behaviour [Sidgwick, by Gray] |
4129 | It is self-evident (from the point of view of the Universe) that no individual has more importance than another [Sidgwick] |
20588 | Sidwick argues for utilitarian institutions, rather than actions [Sidgwick, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |