Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy of Mathematics', 'Platonistic Theories of Universals' and 'Three Grades of Modal Involvement'

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13 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Entities can be multiplied either by excessive categories, or excessive entities within a category [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalists are motivated by Ockham's Razor and a distrust of unobservables [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Four theories of possible worlds: conceptualist, combinatorial, abstract, or concrete [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]