20 ideas
10882 | Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten] |
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
10884 | A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten] |
10885 | Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten] |
10881 | The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten] |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
15797 | All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer] |
15800 | All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer] |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
15798 | Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |
15799 | Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer] |