15 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 10882 | Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten] |
| 10884 | A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten] |
| 10885 | Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten] |
| 10881 | The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 15797 | All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer] |
| 15800 | All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 15798 | Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
| 15799 | Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer] |