13 ideas
| 10882 | Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten] |
| 23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
| 23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
| 23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
| 23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
| 10884 | A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten] |
| 10885 | Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten] |
| 10881 | The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten] |
| 15797 | All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer] |
| 15800 | All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer] |
| 23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
| 15798 | Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer] |
| 15799 | Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer] |