16 ideas
| 10882 | Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten] |
| 6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
| 10884 | A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten] |
| 10885 | Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten] |
| 10881 | The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten] |
| 15797 | All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer] |
| 15800 | All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer] |
| 11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
| 6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
| 6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
| 6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
| 11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
| 6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
| 6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
| 15798 | Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer] |
| 15799 | Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer] |