Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy of Mathematics', 'A World of Dispositions' and 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning'

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18 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer]