75 ideas
15357 | Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten] |
21753 | If we look at the world rationally, the world assumes a rational aspect [Hegel] |
21974 | The world seems rational to those who look at it rationally [Hegel] |
15352 | A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten] |
15324 | Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten] |
15323 | Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten] |
15374 | Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten] |
15348 | Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten] |
15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
15337 | The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten] |
15334 | The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten] |
15336 | The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten] |
15354 | Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten] |
15340 | Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten] |
15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
15373 | Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten] |
15346 | Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten] |
15371 | An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten] |
15332 | 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten] |
15361 | A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten] |
15350 | The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten] |
15351 | Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten] |
15367 | By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten] |
15330 | Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
15331 | Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
15325 | Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten] |
15344 | Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten] |
15356 | Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten] |
15368 | This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten] |
15358 | Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten] |
15359 | Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten] |
15329 | Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten] |
15326 | Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten] |
15341 | Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten] |
15328 | A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten] |
15349 | It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten] |
15366 | Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten] |
15353 | The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten] |
15355 | Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten] |
15364 | English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten] |
15360 | ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten] |
15369 | Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten] |
15370 | Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten] |
15338 | We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten] |
15363 | In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten] |
15362 | If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten] |
20146 | 'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes] |
15372 | Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten] |
15347 | A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten] |
20169 | An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes] |
20149 | To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes] |
19738 | Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes] |
20145 | Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes] |
20170 | Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes] |
20165 | Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes] |
20171 | Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes] |
20175 | If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes] |
20174 | Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes] |
20159 | Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes] |
20161 | The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes] |
20156 | We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes] |
20150 | There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes] |
20158 | Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes] |
20151 | Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes] |
20152 | Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes] |
20153 | Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes] |
20162 | Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes] |
20154 | Control is the key to well-being [Kekes] |
20157 | Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes] |
20172 | Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes] |
20173 | Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes] |
20155 | Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes] |
20164 | The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes] |
20163 | Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes] |
20148 | Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes] |