Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy of Mathematics', 'Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed)' and 'Letter to Bramhall'

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11 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essence is just an artificial word from logic, giving a way of thinking about substances [Hobbes]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]