48 ideas
22317 | Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege] |
9456 | Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette] |
13455 | Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
16895 | The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge] |
10775 | The axiom of choice now seems acceptable and obvious (if it is meaningful) [Tharp] |
3328 | Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
9457 | The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette] |
10766 | Logic is either for demonstration, or for characterizing structures [Tharp] |
9179 | Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett] |
10767 | Elementary logic is complete, but cannot capture mathematics [Tharp] |
10769 | Second-order logic isn't provable, but will express set-theory and classic problems [Tharp] |
13473 | Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
10762 | In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions can be reduced to 'not' and 'and' [Tharp] |
3319 | Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
6076 | For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn] |
9871 | Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
10776 | The main quantifiers extend 'and' and 'or' to infinite domains [Tharp] |
10774 | There are at least five unorthodox quantifiers that could be used [Tharp] |
16884 | Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge] |
9458 | Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette] |
9461 | Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette] |
10777 | Skolem mistakenly inferred that Cantor's conceptions were illusory [Tharp] |
10773 | The Löwenheim-Skolem property is a limitation (e.g. can't say there are uncountably many reals) [Tharp] |
10765 | Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure [Tharp] |
10763 | Completeness and compactness together give axiomatizability [Tharp] |
10770 | If completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas [Tharp] |
10771 | Compactness is important for major theories which have infinitely many axioms [Tharp] |
10772 | Compactness blocks infinite expansion, and admits non-standard models [Tharp] |
10764 | A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas [Tharp] |
10768 | Effective enumeration might be proved but not specified, so it won't guarantee knowledge [Tharp] |
3331 | If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege] |
16880 | Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge] |
8689 | Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend] |
5657 | Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton] |
3318 | Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
16885 | To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge] |
16887 | Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge] |
16894 | An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge] |
16882 | The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege] |
5816 | Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
7307 | A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A] |
7309 | Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
7312 | 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A] |
9460 | Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette] |
9459 | Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette] |
7725 | 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner] |
7316 | Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A] |
3307 | Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |