35 ideas
10775 | The axiom of choice now seems acceptable and obvious (if it is meaningful) [Tharp] |
10766 | Logic is either for demonstration, or for characterizing structures [Tharp] |
10767 | Elementary logic is complete, but cannot capture mathematics [Tharp] |
10769 | Second-order logic isn't provable, but will express set-theory and classic problems [Tharp] |
10762 | In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions can be reduced to 'not' and 'and' [Tharp] |
10776 | The main quantifiers extend 'and' and 'or' to infinite domains [Tharp] |
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
10774 | There are at least five unorthodox quantifiers that could be used [Tharp] |
10777 | Skolem mistakenly inferred that Cantor's conceptions were illusory [Tharp] |
10773 | The Löwenheim-Skolem property is a limitation (e.g. can't say there are uncountably many reals) [Tharp] |
10765 | Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure [Tharp] |
10763 | Completeness and compactness together give axiomatizability [Tharp] |
10770 | If completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas [Tharp] |
10771 | Compactness is important for major theories which have infinitely many axioms [Tharp] |
10772 | Compactness blocks infinite expansion, and admits non-standard models [Tharp] |
10764 | A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas [Tharp] |
10768 | Effective enumeration might be proved but not specified, so it won't guarantee knowledge [Tharp] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
9261 | The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard] |
9262 | The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard] |
9260 | Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard] |
9259 | We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard] |
9258 | If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard] |