47 ideas
7426 | Critical philosophy is what questions domination at every level [Foucault] |
6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
7423 | Philosophy and politics are fundamentally linked [Foucault] |
7420 | When logos controls our desires, we have actually become the logos [Foucault] |
6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
10775 | The axiom of choice now seems acceptable and obvious (if it is meaningful) [Tharp] |
6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
10766 | Logic is either for demonstration, or for characterizing structures [Tharp] |
10767 | Elementary logic is complete, but cannot capture mathematics [Tharp] |
10769 | Second-order logic isn't provable, but will express set-theory and classic problems [Tharp] |
7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
10762 | In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions can be reduced to 'not' and 'and' [Tharp] |
6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
10776 | The main quantifiers extend 'and' and 'or' to infinite domains [Tharp] |
10774 | There are at least five unorthodox quantifiers that could be used [Tharp] |
10777 | Skolem mistakenly inferred that Cantor's conceptions were illusory [Tharp] |
10773 | The Löwenheim-Skolem property is a limitation (e.g. can't say there are uncountably many reals) [Tharp] |
10765 | Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure [Tharp] |
10763 | Completeness and compactness together give axiomatizability [Tharp] |
10770 | If completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas [Tharp] |
10771 | Compactness is important for major theories which have infinitely many axioms [Tharp] |
10772 | Compactness blocks infinite expansion, and admits non-standard models [Tharp] |
10764 | A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas [Tharp] |
10768 | Effective enumeration might be proved but not specified, so it won't guarantee knowledge [Tharp] |
6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
7424 | Saying games of truth were merely power relations would be a horrible exaggeration [Foucault] |
7422 | A subject is a form which can change, in (say) political or sexual situations [Foucault] |
6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
7419 | Ethics is the conscious practice of freedom [Foucault] |
7425 | The aim is not to eliminate power relations, but to reduce domination [Foucault] |
7418 | The idea of liberation suggests there is a human nature which has been repressed [Foucault] |