40 ideas
| 12747 | Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz] |
| 12748 | Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz] |
| 13184 | The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz] |
| 13188 | The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz] |
| 12752 | Only unities have any reality [Leibniz] |
| 13187 | In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz] |
| 19383 | A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz] |
| 13179 | A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz] |
| 12749 | Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz] |
| 12722 | Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz] |
| 12132 | Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody] |
| 19379 | The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz] |
| 15834 | Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
| 12140 | Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody] |
| 11895 | A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
| 12141 | Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody] |
| 12137 | De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody] |
| 12142 | Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody] |
| 12143 | An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody] |
| 12144 | Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody] |
| 12139 | Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody] |
| 13182 | Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz] |
| 12135 | Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody] |
| 13178 | Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz] |
| 19411 | In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz] |
| 19412 | If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz] |
| 12130 | a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody] |
| 490 | Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus] |
| 12138 | Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody] |
| 19410 | Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz] |
| 13183 | Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz] |
| 19409 | Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz] |
| 11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
| 13186 | Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz] |
| 13185 | Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz] |
| 13177 | An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz] |
| 13093 | The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz] |
| 13096 | The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz] |
| 13180 | Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz] |
| 13181 | Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz] |