24 ideas
14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |
490 | Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus] |