63 ideas
23853 | Truth is not a object we love - it is the radiant manifestation of reality [Weil] |
21616 | Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions [Williamson] |
21623 | True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation [Williamson] |
21602 | Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson] |
21611 | Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model [Williamson] |
21606 | 'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson] |
21605 | Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language [Williamson] |
21612 | Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B' [Williamson] |
21599 | A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson] |
23855 | Creation produced a network or web of determinations [Weil] |
21589 | When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson] |
21596 | Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson] |
21601 | A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson] |
21629 | Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson] |
21591 | Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson] |
21619 | If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson] |
21620 | The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson] |
21622 | If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson] |
9120 | Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson] |
21625 | The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson] |
21614 | The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson] |
21617 | We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson] |
21618 | If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson] |
21590 | Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
21592 | Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson] |
21603 | You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson] |
21604 | Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson] |
21607 | Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson] |
21608 | Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson] |
21609 | Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson] |
21610 | Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson] |
21613 | Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
21633 | Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson] |
21630 | If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson] |
21632 | A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson] |
490 | Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus] |
21621 | We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson] |
21627 | We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error [Williamson] |
21626 | Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson] |
21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
21600 | 'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson] |
21615 | References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson] |
18038 | The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson] |
21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
23848 | The aesthete's treatment of beauty as amusement is sacreligious; beauty should nourish [Weil] |
23854 | Beauty is the proof of what is good [Weil] |
23837 | Respect is our only obligation, which can only be expressed through deeds, not words [Weil] |
23844 | The most important human need is to have multiple roots [Weil] |
23838 | The need for order stands above all others, and is understood via the other needs [Weil] |
23836 | Obligations only bind individuals, not collectives [Weil] |
23843 | Even the poorest should feel collective ownership, and participation in grand display [Weil] |
23840 | A citizen should be able to understand the whole of society [Weil] |
23846 | Culture is an instrument for creating an ongoing succession of teachers [Weil] |
23839 | A lifelong head of society should only be a symbol, not a ruler [Weil] |
23842 | Party politics in a democracy can't avoid an anti-democratic party [Weil] |
23847 | Socialism tends to make a proletariat of the whole population [Weil] |
23845 | The capitalists neglect the people and the nation, and even their own interests [Weil] |
23841 | By making money the sole human measure, inequality has become universal [Weil] |
23835 | People have duties, and only have rights because of the obligations of others to them [Weil] |
23852 | To punish people we must ourselves be innocent - but that undermines the desire to punish [Weil] |
23850 | The soldier-civilian distinction should be abolished; every citizen is committed to a war [Weil] |
23851 | Education is essentially motivation [Weil] |
23849 | Religion should quietly suffuse all human life with its light [Weil] |