Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Limits of Reason' and 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
13939 No possible evidence could decide the reality of numbers, so it is a pseudo-question [Carnap]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18696 The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
18701 The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18694 Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
13936 Questions about numbers are answered by analysis, and are analytic, and hence logically true [Carnap]
8748 Logical positivists incorporated geometry into logicism, saying axioms are just definitions [Carnap, by Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
8960 Internal questions about abstractions are trivial, and external ones deeply problematic [Carnap, by Szabó]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
13933 Existence questions are 'internal' (within a framework) or 'external' (concerning the whole framework) [Carnap]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
18692 Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
13934 To be 'real' is to be an element of a system, so we cannot ask reality questions about the system itself [Carnap]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
18693 Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button]
18695 An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
13938 A linguistic framework involves commitment to entities, so only commitment to the framework is in question [Carnap]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
13935 We only accept 'things' within a language with formation, testing and acceptance rules [Carnap]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
490 Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
13932 Empiricists tend to reject abstract entities, and to feel sympathy with nominalism [Carnap]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
13937 New linguistic claims about entities are not true or false, but just expedient, fruitful or successful [Carnap]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
18700 Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
18698 Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
13940 All linguistic forms in science are merely judged by their efficiency as instruments [Carnap]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
18697 A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button]