Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr)' and 'Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

32 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / c. Modern philosophy mid-period
13966 Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
21360 Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
13974 If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
13212 Infinity is only potential, never actual [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
13221 Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
21982 I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
16100 True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle]
16101 A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle]
12133 If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
13213 All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
12134 Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13969 Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
16572 Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? [Aristotle]
16573 Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing [Aristotle]
13214 The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be [Aristotle]
13215 If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change [Aristotle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
13973 A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
13968 Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
16717 Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
13972 Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
13216 Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form [Aristotle]
17994 The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
13224 There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
16594 The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible [Aristotle]
13223 Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
13220 Bodies are endlessly divisible [Aristotle]
13210 Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division? [Aristotle]
13211 If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing? [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
13228 There is no time without movement [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
16595 If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago? [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
13227 Being is better than not-being [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
13226 An Order controls all things [Aristotle]