Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning' and 'Mind and Body'

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25 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
5784 In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
5777 The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
5783 Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
21982 I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
4986 A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
5780 The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
5001 Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
4993 If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
5000 Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
4982 Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
4991 Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
4994 Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
4992 In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
5778 If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
4990 The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
5779 There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
4984 All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
4998 Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4985 If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
4997 It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
4999 For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4995 Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
5781 Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
5782 A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
5776 A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]