59 ideas
15477 | Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions [Martin,CB] |
13395 | If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien] |
15471 | Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB] |
13378 | It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien] |
13402 | We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien] |
13405 | The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien] |
13399 | Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien] |
13398 | We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien] |
13392 | Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien] |
21982 | I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L] |
13404 | To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien] |
13386 | If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien] |
13403 | The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien] |
15484 | A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB] |
15478 | Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB] |
15483 | Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB] |
15480 | Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB] |
15489 | A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB] |
15487 | If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB] |
15479 | Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB] |
15488 | Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB] |
15469 | Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB] |
15467 | Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB] |
15466 | 'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB] |
13375 | The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien] |
13393 | Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien] |
13388 | It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien] |
13384 | Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien] |
13385 | Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien] |
13383 | If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien] |
13400 | If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien] |
13401 | The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien] |
15476 | Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB] |
15465 | Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB] |
15481 | I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB] |
13380 | Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien] |
15474 | Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB] |
13376 | We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien] |
13381 | Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien] |
13382 | Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien] |
15486 | Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB] |
15475 | The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB] |
13379 | If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien] |
13394 | Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien] |
13391 | Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien] |
13374 | To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien] |
15472 | It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB] |
13389 | The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien] |
13390 | Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien] |
15492 | Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB] |
15495 | Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB] |
15493 | Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered [Martin,CB] |
13396 | Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien] |
13377 | First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien] |
15485 | Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB] |
15491 | Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB] |
15468 | Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB] |
15470 | Causal laws are summaries of powers [Martin,CB] |
15482 | We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum [Martin,CB] |