Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Universals' and 'Being You'

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22 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
21982 I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
4444 One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
4445 If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
4448 Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
4446 It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
4440 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong]
4439 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4431 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
4433 Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong]
4432 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
4436 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong]
4434 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong]
4435 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
4437 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong]
4438 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
23513 Single neurons can carry out complex functions [Seth]
23514 The cerbellum has a huge number of neurons, but little involvement in consciousness [Seth]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
23516 Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
23519 The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
23518 Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
23517 Volition is felt as doing what you want, with possible alternatives, and a source from within [Seth]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
23515 Human exceptionalism plagues biology, and most other human thinking [Seth]