Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals' and 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington]
Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]