Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Discourse on Metaphysics' and 'Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr)'

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39 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
Infinity is only potential, never actual [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle]
A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle]
If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? [Aristotle]
Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing [Aristotle]
The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be [Aristotle]
If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change [Aristotle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form [Aristotle]
The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible [Aristotle]
Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Bodies are endlessly divisible [Aristotle]
Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division? [Aristotle]
If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing? [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
There is no time without movement [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago? [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Being is better than not-being [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
An Order controls all things [Aristotle]