Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius'' and 'Causes and Conditions'

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13 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
The soul doesn't understand many of its own actions, if perceptions are confused and desires buried [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
Minds unconsciously count vibration beats in music, and enjoy it when they coincide [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]