28 ideas
7740 | There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner] |
19466 | The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege] |
19465 | There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege] |
19468 | The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege] |
8472 | Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein] |
8476 | Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein] |
8480 | S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein] |
8474 | Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein] |
8465 | Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein] |
8452 | Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein] |
8475 | The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein] |
8454 | The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein] |
8473 | The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein] |
19470 | Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege] |
21982 | I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L] |
19471 | A fact is a thought that is true [Frege] |
8458 | Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein] |
9877 | Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett] |
8457 | The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein] |
19469 | We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege] |
8162 | Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett] |
9818 | A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett] |
16379 | Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege] |
8477 | People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein] |
8471 | Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein] |
19467 | A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege] |
8484 | If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein] |
19472 | A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege] |