Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'The Thought: a Logical Enquiry' and 'Letters to Burcher De Volder'

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40 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz]
Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz]
The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Only unities have any reality [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
A fact is a thought that is true [Frege]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz]
If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz]
In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett]
A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett]
We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz]