Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'The Metaphysics of Modality' and 'An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
12027 There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
16477 Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
12005 The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
16484 There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
16486 The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
2947 Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
12010 Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
16483 Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell]
16480 A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell]
16479 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell]
16481 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell]
16487 Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
16475 A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
21982 I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
12023 Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
12017 In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
12024 If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11885 Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
12014 An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G]
12015 Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
12013 Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
12012 Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
12022 Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G]
12025 Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12020 An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
11888 Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
12003 De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
12028 De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
12008 Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G]
12009 The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
12007 Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
12011 Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G]
12016 The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
12004 Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
12021 Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G]
12029 We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
16482 All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
4758 Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
16476 For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
16485 Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
16478 A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell]