20 ideas
15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
12797 | If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock] |
15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
17694 | Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock] |
17695 | Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock] |
21982 | I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L] |
12792 | The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock] |
12799 | Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock] |
12818 | We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock] |
12795 | Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock] |
15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |
15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
17696 | 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock] |
15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
12791 | It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock] |
15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |