Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics' and 'Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


30 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Rejecting double negation elimination undermines reductio proofs [Colyvan]
Showing a disproof is impossible is not a proof, so don't eliminate double negation [Colyvan]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle says P or not-P; bivalence says P is either true or false [Colyvan]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Löwenheim proved his result for a first-order sentence, and Skolem generalised it [Colyvan]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Axioms are 'categorical' if all of their models are isomorphic [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Ordinal numbers represent order relations [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Intuitionists only accept a few safe infinities [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
Infinitesimals were sometimes zero, and sometimes close to zero [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Reducing real numbers to rationals suggested arithmetic as the foundation of maths [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
Transfinite induction moves from all cases, up to the limit ordinal [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Most mathematical proofs are using set theory, but without saying so [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Structuralism say only 'up to isomorphism' matters because that is all there is to it [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
If 'in re' structures relies on the world, does the world contain rich enough structures? [Colyvan]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Probability supports Bayesianism better as degrees of belief than as ratios of frequencies [Colyvan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Mathematics can reveal structural similarities in diverse systems [Colyvan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
Mathematics can show why some surprising events have to occur [Colyvan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / m. Explanation by proof
Proof by cases (by 'exhaustion') is said to be unexplanatory [Colyvan]
Reductio proofs do not seem to be very explanatory [Colyvan]
If inductive proofs hold because of the structure of natural numbers, they may explain theorems [Colyvan]
Can a proof that no one understands (of the four-colour theorem) really be a proof? [Colyvan]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Mathematical generalisation is by extending a system, or by abstracting away from it [Colyvan]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
Concepts are abstracted from perceptions [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer]