16 ideas
| 18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
| 18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
| 18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
| 18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
| 18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
| 18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
| 18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
| 21982 | I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L] |
| 18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
| 5673 | If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam] |
| 5670 | Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam] |
| 5671 | Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam] |
| 5672 | Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam] |
| 5675 | Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam] |
| 5674 | We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam] |
| 18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |