Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Philosophy of Language' and 'Philosophy of Language'

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18 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan]
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan]
It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan]
Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]