86 ideas
17240 | Definitions are the first step in philosophy [Hobbes] |
4194 | Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe] |
4214 | Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe] |
4222 | If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe] |
4217 | It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe] |
17237 | Definitions of things that are caused must express their manner of generation [Hobbes] |
17239 | Definition is resolution of names into successive genera, and finally the difference [Hobbes] |
17241 | A defined name should not appear in the definition [Hobbes] |
17242 | 'Petitio principii' is reusing the idea to be defined, in disguised words [Hobbes] |
17245 | A part of a part is a part of a whole [Hobbes] |
4229 | An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe] |
4240 | It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe] |
17258 | If we just say one, one, one, one, we don't know where we have got to [Hobbes] |
4241 | If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe] |
21982 | I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L] |
4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
17253 | Change is nothing but movement [Hobbes] |
4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
16670 | Accidents are just modes of thinking about bodies [Hobbes] |
16621 | Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size [Hobbes] |
4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe] |
4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe] |
4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe] |
16734 | The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes] |
4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe] |
17247 | The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes] |
4232 | Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe] |
4205 | 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe] |
4233 | If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe] |
14960 | Bodies are independent of thought, and coincide with part of space [Hobbes] |
17250 | If you separate the two places of one thing, you will also separate the thing [Hobbes] |
17249 | If you separated two things in the same place, you would also separate the places [Hobbes] |
4206 | Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe] |
17248 | If a whole body is moved, its parts must move with it [Hobbes] |
4204 | Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe] |
16790 | A body is always the same, whether the parts are together or dispersed [Hobbes] |
17244 | To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes] |
17233 | Particulars contain universal things [Hobbes] |
17246 | Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes] |
17251 | The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes] |
17257 | It is the same river if it has the same source, no matter what flows in it [Hobbes] |
12853 | Some individuate the ship by unity of matter, and others by unity of form [Hobbes] |
17256 | If a new ship were made of the discarded planks, would two ships be numerically the same? [Hobbes] |
4198 | If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe] |
4199 | A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe] |
4200 | If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe] |
16794 | As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes] |
4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe] |
17255 | Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes] |
4195 | It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe] |
16582 | We can imagine a point swelling and contracting - but not how this could be done [Hobbes] |
4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe] |
4223 | Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe] |
4193 | The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe] |
17238 | Science aims to show causes and generation of things [Hobbes] |
17260 | Imagination is just weakened sensation [Hobbes] |
19373 | A 'conatus' is an initial motion, experienced by us as desire or aversion [Hobbes, by Arthur,R] |
2948 | Sensation is merely internal motion of the sentient being [Hobbes] |
17261 | Apart from pleasure and pain, the only emotions are appetite and aversion [Hobbes] |
17236 | Words are not for communication, but as marks for remembering what we have learned [Hobbes] |
4238 | The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe] |
4237 | Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe] |
16600 | Prime matter is body considered with mere size and extension, and potential [Hobbes] |
17252 | Acting on a body is either creating or destroying a property in it [Hobbes] |
4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe] |
4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
17254 | An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause [Hobbes] |
4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe] |
4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe] |
17235 | A cause is the complete sum of the features which necessitate the effect [Hobbes] |
4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe] |
14581 | The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
4224 | If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe] |
17234 | Motion is losing one place and acquiring another [Hobbes] |
17259 | 'Force' is the quantity of movement imposed on something [Hobbes] |
4227 | Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe] |
4228 | If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe] |
17243 | Past times can't exist anywhere, apart from in our memories [Hobbes] |