Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Action' and 'Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion'

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61 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
An analogy begins to break down as soon as the two cases differ [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Events are baffling before experience, and obvious after experience [Hume]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
You have only begun to do real science when you can express it in numbers [Kelvin]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R]
Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R]
Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R]
If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 3. Actions and Events
I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R]
The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R]
Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R]
Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R]
You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R]
The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R]
Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R]
A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R]
An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R]
An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R]
If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R]
For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R]
A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R]
In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R]
There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
Energy has progressed from a mere formula, to a principle pervading all nature [Kelvin]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
We can't assume God's perfections are like our ideas or like human attributes [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
The objects of theological reasoning are too big for our minds [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
No being's non-existence can imply a contradiction, so its existence cannot be proved a priori [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
A chain of events requires a cause for the whole as well as the parts, yet the chain is just a sum of parts [Hume]
If something must be necessary so that something exists rather than nothing, why can't the universe be necessary? [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The thing which contains order must be God, so see God where you see order [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
Analogy suggests that God has a very great human mind [Hume]
The universe may be the result of trial-and-error [Hume]
Order may come from an irrational source as well as a rational one [Hume]
Design cannot prove a unified Deity. Many men make a city, so why not many gods for a world? [Hume]
From a ship you would judge its creator a genius, not a mere humble workman [Hume]
This excellent world may be the result of a huge sequence of trial-and-error [Hume]
Humans renew their species sexually. If there are many gods, would they not do the same? [Hume]
Creation is more like vegetation than human art, so it won't come from reason [Hume]
This Creator god might be an infant or incompetent or senile [Hume]
Motion often begins in matter, with no sign of a controlling agent [Hume]
The universe could settle into superficial order, without a designer [Hume]
Ideas arise from objects, not vice versa; ideas only influence matter if they are linked [Hume]
A surprise feature of all products of 9 looks like design, but is actually a necessity [Hume]
From our limited view, we cannot tell if the universe is faulty [Hume]
If the divine cause is proportional to its effects, the effects are finite, so the Deity cannot be infinite [Hume]
How can we pronounce on a whole after a brief look at a very small part? [Hume]
Why would we infer an infinite creator from a finite creation? [Hume]