111 ideas
| 14456 | 'Socrates is human' expresses predication, and 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity [Russell] |
| 14426 | A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property [Russell] |
| 8468 | The sentence 'procrastination drinks quadruplicity' is meaningless, rather than false [Russell, by Orenstein] |
| 5728 | The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius] |
| 18335 | There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami] |
| 18334 | The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami] |
| 18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |
| 18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
| 18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |
| 18340 | It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami] |
| 18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |
| 18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |
| 18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
| 18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
| 18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
| 18337 | Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami] |
| 14454 | An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell] |
| 18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
| 14453 | The Darapti syllogism is fallacious: All M is S, all M is P, so some S is P' - but if there is no M? [Russell] |
| 18350 | Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami] |
| 14427 | We can enumerate finite classes, but an intensional definition is needed for infinite classes [Russell] |
| 14428 | Members define a unique class, whereas defining characteristics are numerous [Russell] |
| 14447 | Infinity says 'for any inductive cardinal, there is a class having that many terms' [Russell] |
| 14440 | We may assume that there are infinite collections, as there is no logical reason against them [Russell] |
| 14443 | The British parliament has one representative selected from each constituency [Russell] |
| 14445 | Choice shows that if any two cardinals are not equal, one must be the greater [Russell] |
| 14444 | Choice is equivalent to the proposition that every class is well-ordered [Russell] |
| 14446 | We can pick all the right or left boots, but socks need Choice to insure the representative class [Russell] |
| 14459 | Reducibility: a family of functions is equivalent to a single type of function [Russell] |
| 14461 | Propositions about classes can be reduced to propositions about their defining functions [Russell] |
| 8469 | Russell's proposal was that only meaningful predicates have sets as their extensions [Russell, by Orenstein] |
| 8745 | Classes are logical fictions, and are not part of the ultimate furniture of the world [Russell] |
| 14452 | All the propositions of logic are completely general [Russell] |
| 14462 | In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical [Russell] |
| 10057 | Logic can only assert hypothetical existence [Russell] |
| 12444 | Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology [Russell] |
| 14464 | Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world [Russell] |
| 14458 | Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell] |
| 10450 | Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach] |
| 14457 | Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
| 7311 | The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
| 14455 | 'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell] |
| 14442 | If straight lines were like ratios they might intersect at a 'gap', and have no point in common [Russell] |
| 14438 | New numbers solve problems: negatives for subtraction, fractions for division, complex for equations [Russell] |
| 13510 | Could a number just be something which occurs in a progression? [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
| 14436 | A series can be 'Cut' in two, where the lower class has no maximum, the upper no minimum [Russell] |
| 14439 | A complex number is simply an ordered couple of real numbers [Russell] |
| 14421 | Discovering that 1 is a number was difficult [Russell] |
| 14424 | Numbers are needed for counting, so they need a meaning, and not just formal properties [Russell] |
| 14441 | The formal laws of arithmetic are the Commutative, the Associative and the Distributive [Russell] |
| 14420 | Infinity and continuity used to be philosophy, but are now mathematics [Russell] |
| 14431 | The definition of order needs a transitive relation, to leap over infinite intermediate terms [Russell] |
| 14422 | Any founded, non-repeating series all reachable in steps will satisfy Peano's axioms [Russell] |
| 14423 | '0', 'number' and 'successor' cannot be defined by Peano's axioms [Russell] |
| 14425 | A number is something which characterises collections of the same size [Russell] |
| 14434 | What matters is the logical interrelation of mathematical terms, not their intrinsic nature [Russell] |
| 14465 | Maybe numbers are adjectives, since 'ten men' grammatically resembles 'white men' [Russell] |
| 13414 | For Russell, numbers are sets of equivalent sets [Russell, by Benacerraf] |
| 14449 | There is always something psychological about inference [Russell] |
| 14463 | Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named [Russell] |
| 14429 | Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell] |
| 18336 | Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami] |
| 14430 | If a relation is symmetrical and transitive, it has to be reflexive [Russell] |
| 14432 | 'Asymmetry' is incompatible with its converse; a is husband of b, so b can't be husband of a [Russell] |
| 14435 | The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science [Russell] |
| 12197 | Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true [Russell] |
| 14450 | All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions [Russell] |
| 14460 | If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell] |
| 5702 | The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius] |
| 5729 | If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius] |
| 5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
| 5727 | Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius] |
| 14433 | Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them? [Russell] |
| 5714 | Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius] |
| 5718 | The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius] |
| 5717 | The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius] |
| 21387 | The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius] |
| 5709 | The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius] |
| 5695 | Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius] |
| 5711 | The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius] |
| 5712 | Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius] |
| 5719 | The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius] |
| 5724 | Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius] |
| 5713 | You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius] |
| 14451 | Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell] |
| 6611 | One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius] |
| 5730 | Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius] |
| 5726 | The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius] |
| 5705 | Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius] |
| 5716 | Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius] |
| 5704 | There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius] |
| 5703 | The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius] |
| 5693 | Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius] |
| 5701 | If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius] |
| 5708 | In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius] |
| 17004 | Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius] |
| 5696 | If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius] |
| 5706 | Atoms move themselves [Lucretius] |
| 5700 | It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius] |
| 5698 | We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius] |
| 5715 | This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius] |
| 5694 | Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius] |
| 5699 | If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius] |
| 5707 | The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius] |
| 5710 | Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius] |
| 5731 | Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius] |
| 5722 | For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius] |
| 5725 | An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius] |
| 5720 | Spirit is mortal [Lucretius] |
| 5721 | The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius] |
| 5723 | If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius] |