Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Nature of the Universe', 'New Essays on Human Understanding' and 'The Mind in Nature'

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176 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions [Martin,CB]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz]
If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz]
Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius]
Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz]
I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz]
A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz]
Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz]
If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz]
Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB]
Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB]
Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB]
Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz]
I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz]
We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz]
If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz]
Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB]
The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
No two things are totally identical [Leibniz]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz]
We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz]
The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz]
Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz]
All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz]
We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz]
The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius]
The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius]
The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered [Martin,CB]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius]
Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius]
Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz]
We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz]
Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz]
The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz]
The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius]
The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius]
If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius]
In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB]
Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz]
Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz]
Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Causal laws are summaries of powers [Martin,CB]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius]
Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz]
Atoms move themselves [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum [Martin,CB]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz]
A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Spirit is mortal [Lucretius]
For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius]
An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius]
If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / c. Animal Souls
Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz]